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Making Lemonade: A New Approach to
Evaluating Evolution Disclaimers Under the
Establishment Clause
Louis J. VIRELLI III*
I.
The evolution debate in America has recently gained unprecedented
momentum. On January 3, 2006, a California school district introduced
a course advocating concepts of creationism, including "intelligent
design."1  On November 8, 2005, the Kansas Board of Education
adopted revised public school science standards that are critical of
evolution.2 Approximately one year earlier, a school board in Dover,
Pennsylvania instituted a policy requiring that public school science stu-
dents be presented with a statement criticizing evolution and encourag-
* Trial Attorney, United States Department of Justice; J.D., University of Pennsylvania Law
School, 2000; M.S.E., University of Pennsylvania, 1997; B.S.E., Duke University, 1996. The
analyses, views, and opinions expressed herein are the author's alone and in no way reflect a
position of the Department of Justice or the United States Government.
1. See Louis Sahagun & Eric Bailey, A Fault Line for 'Intelligent Design,' L.A. TMEs, Jan.
12, 2006, at Al. Intelligent design is an explanation of human creation that espouses the existence
of a supernatural influence as the creator of humankind, and that many see as contrary to the
theory of evolution. See, e.g., PERCIVAL DAVIS & DEAN KENYON, OF PANDAS AND PEOPLE: THE
CENTRAL QUESTION OF BIOLOGICAL ORIGINS (2d ed. 1993) (setting forth the principles of
intelligent design); Tavis Smiley (PBS television broadcast Aug. 29, 2005) (transcript available
at http://www.pbs.org/kcet/tavissmiley/archive/200508/20050829_transcript.html) (interviewing
Stephen Meyer, Senior Fellow, Discovery Institute, and discussing intelligent design) [hereinafter
Tavis Smiley].
2. See, e.g., Jodi Wilgoren, Kansas Board Approves Challenges to Evolution, N.Y. TIES,
Nov. 8, 2005, at A14; Dennis Overbye, Philosophers Notwithstanding, Kansas School Board
Redefines Science, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2005, at F3; Scott Rothschild, Criticism of Evolution
Added to Science Standards, LAWRENCE J.-WORLD, Nov. 9, 2005, available at http://www2.
ljworld.conmnew/2005/nov/09/criticism-evolution addedscience-standards/?evolution.
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ing them to consider intelligent design as an alternative explanation of
human origins.3 In a group interview at the White House on August 1,
2005, President George W. Bush told reporters that in his opinion intelli-
gent design should be included alongside evolution in public school sci-
ence classes.4 These developments highlight what has become a deeply
divisive national issue: the role of religion in public education and, in
particular, the predominance of evolution as the lone scientific explana-
tion of human origins in public schools.5
The United States is a deeply religious country.6 Our culture, tradi-
3. See, e.g., Mike Weiss, War of Ideas Fought in a Small-Town Courtroom, S.F. CHRON.
Nov. 6, 2005, at Al (quoting Dover school board resolution regarding evolution: "'Because
Darwin's Theory is a theory, it continues to be tested.... The Theory is not a fact. Gaps exist in
the Theory for which there is no evidence.... Intelligent Design is an explanation of the origin of
life that differs from Darwin's view .... Students are encouraged to keep an open mind"'); Bill
Sulon, Intelligent Design Trial Ends, TiE PATRIOT NEWS, Nov. 5, 2005, available at http://www.
pennlive.com/news/patriotnews/index.ssf?/base/news/1131199230170280 (discussing Dover
resolution). The school board's policy was invalidated by the district court on December 15,
2005. See Kitzmiller v. Dover Area Sch. Dist., 400 F. Supp. 2d 707 (M.D. Pa. 2005).
4. See Peter Baker and Peter Slevin, Bush Remarks on 'Intelligent Design' Theory Fuel
Debate, WASH. PosT, Aug. 3, 2005, at Al ("President Bush invigorated proponents of teaching
alternatives to evolution in public schools with remarks saying that schoolchildren should be
taught about 'intelligent design' .... ); Daniel C. Dennett, Show Me the Science, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 28, 2005, at 11 (referring to President Bush's comment that "he was in favor of teaching
about 'intelligent design' in the schools").
A similar comment was made in December 2005 by Senator John McCain of Arizona, who
told an interviewer that we should "[1]et the student decide" which explanation of human origins
(evolution or intelligent design) is correct. C.J. Karamargin, McCain Brings His Message to MTV
Audience, ARIz. DAILY STAR, Dec. 26, 2005, available at http://www.azstarnet.comlallheadlines/
108592.
5. See Nancy Gibbs, Parents Behaving Badly, TIME, Feb. 21, 2005, at 40, 49 (explaining that
parents of schoolchildren "are often as concerned about content as grades, as in the debate over
creationism vs. evolution vs. intelligent design"); Charles Krauthammer, Phony Theory, False
Conflict, WASH. POST, Nov. 18, 2005, at A23 (stating that "every few years this country... insists
on hearing yet another appeal of the Scopes monkey trial"); Michael D. Lemonick, Stealth Attack
on Evolution, TIME, Jan. 31, 2005, at 53, 54 (discussing the creationism/evolution debate in public
schools); Tavis Smiley, supra note I (discussing intelligent design and the possibility of
introducing it in public schools); Jay Tolson, Divided, We Stand, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Aug.
8, 2005, at 42, 45 (noting that since public schools were founded in the 1820's, Americans have
been "forced to confront the question of what kind of religious principles should inform the moral
instruction of children in these schools"); Claudia Wallis, The Evolution Wars, TIME, Aug. 15,
2005, at 26 (outlining the ongoing debate over how to teach human origins).
6. See, e.g., Bauchman v. W. High Sch., 132 F.3d 542, 554 (10th Cir. 1997) ("Courts have
long recognized the historical, social and cultural significance of religion in our lives and in the
world, generally. Courts also have recognized that 'a variety of motives and purposes are
implicated' by government activity in a pluralistic society." (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S.
668, 680 (1984))); RICHARD G. HUTCHESON, JR., GOD IN THE WHITE HOUSE (1988); Daniel 0.
Conkle, The Path of American Religious Liberty: From the Original Theology to Formal
Neutrality and an Uncertain Future, 75 IND. L.J. 1, 31 (2000) ("[R]eligion not only influences
politics in the contemporary United States, but . . . religion is [incorporated into] politics to a
degree that may be unparalleled in the American past."); Understanding American Evangelicals:
A Conversation with Mark Noll and Jay Tolson, CENTER CONVERSATIONS (Ethics & Pub. Pol'y
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tions, politics, and law are all imbued with religious symbols, state-
ments, and principles.7 Religion is in turn the source of some of the
nation's most contentious debates. Famously divisive issues such as
abortion, gay rights, and the right to die are inextricably intertwined with
religious doctrine and conviction. 8 At the heart of many of these issues
lies the question of the proper role of religion in public life. Religious
adherents often seek to have their convictions reflected in public institu-
tions. This desire is manifest in religiously motivated support of public
policies, political candidates, and judicial nominees.9
Center, Washington, D.C.), June 2004, at 7, available at http://www.eppc.org/docLib/
20040602_cc%2329v8.pdf (quoting historian George Marsden as saying that "'[n]ot to
understand religion... in American history is like trying to make sense of Moby Dick without the
whale' ").
According to the U.S. Census Bureau, more than eighty percent (roughly 167 million out of
207 million) of American adults in 2005 consider themselves "adherents to a religious
community." U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 2004-2005,
at 55 (2004), available at http://www.census.gov/prodlwww/statistical-abstract-2001_2005.html.
Fifty-eight percent of Americans in 2003 "say that belief in God is a prerequisite to personal
morality." THE PEW GLOBAL ATTITUDES PROJECT, VIEWS OF A CHANGING WORLD 115 (2003),
available at http://people-press.org/reports/pdf/1 85.pdf. Finally, as of 1997, sixty-one percent of
Americans believed that democracy cannot survive "without a widespread belief in God or a
Supreme Being." George Gallup Jr., Religion in America: Will the Vitality of Churches Be the
Surprise of the Next Century?, U.S. SoC'Y & VALUES, Mar. 1997, http://usinfo.state.gov/journals/
itsv/0397/ijse/tocsv.htm.
7. See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 674 (1984) ("There is an unbroken history of
official acknowledgment by all three branches of government of the role of religion in American
life from at least 1789."); 4 U.S.C. § 4 (2000) (providing the Pledge of Allegiance, which includes
the phrase "one Nation under God"); Jay Sekulow, Why the Supreme Court Should Save the
Pledge of Allegiance, http://www.constitutioncenter.org/education/ForEducators/Viewpoints/
WhytheSupremeCourtShouldProtectthePledgeofAllegiance.shtml (last visited Oct. 7, 2005)
(reciting "the words that have been used to open each session of the high court for hundreds of
years-'God save the United States and this Honorable Court"'); U.S Dep't of Treasury, Fact
Sheets: Currency and Coins, http://www.treas.gov/education/fact-sheets/currency/in-god-we-trust.
shtml ("The motto IN GOD WE TRUST was placed on United States coins largely because of the
increased religious sentiment existing during the Civil War.").
8. See, e.g., Nancy Gibbs, The Faith Factor, TIME, June 21, 2004, at 26, 26 ("It's only
natural that a country founded by pilgrims would never let its politics wander far from its faith.");
Laurie Goodstein, Schiavo Case Highlights Catholic-Evangelical Alliance, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24,
2005, at A20 ("Now the alliance of evangelicals and Catholics is among the most powerful forces
molding American politics."); Linda Greenhouse, Justices Explore U.S. Authority over States on
Assisted Suicide, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 2005, at Al (describing how the issue of assisted suicide
"attracted dozens of briefs ... from medical professionals, elected officials, and religious and
policy organizations"); Adam Nagourney, G.O.P. Right is Splintered on Schiavo Intervention,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 2005, at A14 (addressing the role of religion in the debate over an
individual's right to die); Jay Tolson, Divided, We Stand, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Aug. 8,
2005, at 42, 44 (explaining that many of the most controversial "issues of our time" are imbued
with the question of "religion's place in American politics and public life"); Alan Wolfe, The
State of the Church-State Debate, SLATE, Aug. 1, 2005, http://www.slate.com/id/2123459/
(discussing the debate generally).
9. See, e.g., Peter Baker & Charles Babington, Role of Religion Emerges As Issue, WASH.
POST, Oct. 13, 2005, at A8 ("President Bush said yesterday that it was appropriate for the White
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60:423
A tension is created, however, when religious preferences are no
longer simply a reason for casting a particular vote, but instead are the
subject of that vote. The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment
addresses that tension by ensuring governmental neutrality with respect
to religion. ' 0 In the last century, however, the proper scope and applica-
tion of the Establishment Clause has been a source of heated debate. A
common battleground for this debate is the public schools," with per-
haps the most persistent issue being whether and how to teach students
about the origins of human existence. Two competing viewpoints domi-
nate this discussion. The theory of evolution contends that humans
developed from lower life forms through a process of adaptation and
development known as "natural selection."' 2 Creationism, by contrast,
subscribes to the biblical account of human beings' appearance on
Earth.
13
In their struggle to reconcile these competing viewpoints with their
educational mission and their constituents' religious beliefs, state and
local governments have adopted a variety of legislative measures,
including prohibiting the teaching of evolution and requiring that crea-
House to invoke Supreme Court nominee Harriet Miers's religion in making the case for her to
skeptical conservatives, triggering a debate over what role, if any, her evangelical faith should
play in the confirmation battle."); Fred Barbash and Peter Baker, Bush Selects Alito for Supreme
Court, WASH. POST, Oct. 31, 2005, available at http://pewforum.org/news/display.
php?NEWSID=5603 (citing as prominent issues in Judge Alito's pending confirmation hearings
"his record on abortion rights and church-state issues"); Robert Barnes, A Triumph for Warner,
and a Guide for His Party, WASH. POST, Nov. 9, 2005, at Al (discussing the importance of
religious faith in 2005 elections); David S. Broder, Need to Connect with Religious, Rural Voters
Noted, WASH. POST, Nov. 4, 2004, at A35 (citing Democrats' "need to... reconnect with people
of faith" after the 2004 presidential election); Nancy Gibbs, The Faith Factor, TIME, June 21,
2004, at 26 (describing the importance of religion in the 2004 presidential campaign and "the
story of presidential faith throughout history"); David D. Kirkpatrick, Frist Set to Use Religious
Stage on Judicial Issue, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 15, 2005, at Al (describing how religious sentiment has
become an important factor in providing political support for judicial nominees).
10. U.S. CONST. amend. I (prohibiting Congress from making any law "respecting an
establishment of religion"). This prohibition has been extended to state and local lawmakers
through the Fourteenth Amendment. Everson v. Bd. Of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1947)
(incorporating the Establishment Clause); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 670 (1925)
(incorporating the First Amendment).
11. See, e.g., Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 653 (2002) (upholding school
voucher program); Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 112-13 (2001)
(concluding that permitting religious student groups to use school facilities does not violate the
Establishment Clause); Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 302 (2000) (striking
student-initiated and student-led prayer at school).
12. See generally CHARLES DARWIN, ON THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES (1859).
13. See Deborah A. Reule, Note, The New Face of Creationism: The Establishment Clause
and the Latest Efforts to Suppress Evolution in Public Schools, 54 VAND. L. REv. 2555, 2557 n. 10
(2001) ("[Creationism is defined as] the viewpoint that the literal Biblical account of creation is
the correct explanation for the origin of the earth and its living forms.").
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tionism and evolution be taught together.' 4 These measures, however,
have all been invalidated under the Establishment Clause. 5 As a result,
creationists are forced to adopt new methods of promoting their view of
human origins. One of those approaches is the advancement of intelli-
gent design, the idea that human beings are the product of an "intelli-
gent," or supernatural, designer. 16  Although experiencing some
momentum, particularly after President Bush's supportive remarks,
intelligent design has yet to become part of any public school curricu-
lum, and is widely regarded as an inchoate political movement.' 7
The more popular approach for combating evolution instruction is
the use of evolution disclaimers-qualifying statements about the verac-
ity of evolution's explanation of human origins. Unlike prior policies
that sought either to eradicate evolution instruction or mandate lessons
in creationism, disclaimers are more subtle and adaptable to changes in
constitutional doctrine. Although every disclaimer challenged under the
Establishment Clause to date has been invalidated, new versions are
continually being developed and introduced into public school curricula.
Lawmakers rely on decisions invalidating disclaimers to assist them in
designing new ones tailored to avoid the constitutional shortfalls of their
14. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 80-1627, 80-1628 (1960) (prohibiting public schools from
teaching "the theory or doctrine that mankind ascended or descended from a lower order of
animals"); ARK. CODE ANN. § 80-1663 (1985 Supp.) (requiring balanced treatment of evolution
and creationism in public schools); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 17:286.1-17:286.7 (1981) (forbidding
evolution instruction in public school unless accompanied by instruction in creationism).
15. See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 593 (1987) (invalidating Louisiana's balanced
treatment statute); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 109 (1968) (invalidating Arkansas'
prohibition on teaching evolution); McLean v. Ark. Bd. of Educ., 529 F. Supp. 1255, 1274 (E.D.
Ark. 1982) (invalidating Arkansas' balanced treatment statute).
16. See DAVIS & KENYON, supra note 1; Reule, supra note 13, at 2587; Jerry Coyne, The
Faith That Dare Not Speak Its Name: The Case Against Intelligent Design, THE NEW REPUBLIC,
Aug. 22, 2005, at 21, 23 (describing intelligent design as consisting of both "a simple critique of
evolutionary theory," and "the assertion that the major features of life are best understood as the
result of creation by a supernatural intelligent designer").
17. See, e.g., Kitzmiller v. Dover Area Sch. Dist., 400 F. Supp. 2d 707, 745 (M.D. Pa. 2005)
(striking down an evolution disclaimer that referred to intelligent design as an alternate
explanation of human origins, and concluding that intelligent design "is not science"); Claudia
Wallis, The Evolution Wars, TIME, Aug. 15, 2005, at 27, 30-32 (explaining that creationists are
focusing on "'attempting to get criticism of Darwinian evolution in the science standards, not
intelligent design,"' and explaining that "[e]ven scientists who believe in intelligent design do not
feel it is ready for prime time"); Marilyn Rauber, Creationists Try to Edge Around Ban, RICH.
TIMEs-DISPATCH, Dec. 5, 2004, at Al (explaining that "the tactic that most worries supporters of
evolution is the use of anti-evolution disclaimers," rather than the introduction of intelligent
design); Tavis Smiley, supra note 1 (including an explanation by Stephen Meyer, a leading
proponent of intelligent design, that "we're not asking for [intelligent design] to be required in the
schools"); Nicole Winfield, Vatican Paper Hits 'Intelligent Design', WASH. POST, Jan. 18, 2006,
available at http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory?id= 1519041 ("The Vatican newspaper
has published an article saying 'intelligent design' is not science and that teaching it alongside
evolutionary theory in school classrooms only creates confusion.").
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predecessors. The result is a new generation of disclaimers that are
facially neutral with regard to religion-they criticize evolution without
any explicit reference to a specific religion or religious doctrine. Facial
neutrality alone, however, cannot render evolution disclaimers constitu-
tional. 18 To the extent that they constitute a governmental advancement
of religion,' 9 neutral disclaimers violate the Establishment Clause as
readily as their religiously explicit counterparts.
Current Establishment Clause doctrine, however, is ill-equipped to
deal with evolution disclaimers, and particularly facially neutral dis-
claimers. A new constitutional standard is necessary that can consist-
ently and reliably evaluate the shifting disclaimer landscape.20 Part II
discusses the history of the evolution debate, culminating in the rela-
tively recent focus on disclaimers as the preferred means of combating
evolution instruction. Part III considers the development of the Estab-
lishment Clause doctrine in the context of public school instruction on
human origins, focusing on courts' creation and subsequent departure
from the standard set in Lemon v. Kurtzman,2" and points out the short-
comings of those interpretations in evaluating evolution disclaimers.
Finally, in light of the problems with existing doctrine, Part IV suggests
a more comprehensive approach for evaluating the new generation of
facially neutral evolution disclaimers under the Establishment Clause.
II.
After taking root in the nineteenth century, the debate over evolu-
tion instruction peaked in the 1920's with the coincident rise to promi-
nence of religious fundamentalism and Darwinism.22 Tennessee,
18. See, e.g., Selman v. Cobb County Sch. Dist., 390 F. Supp 2d 1286, 1313 (N.D. Ga. 2005)
(invalidating facially neutral evolution disclaimer).
19. The criticism of evolution or the promotion of sectarian viewpoints on human origins is
primarily an evangelical Christian pursuit. THE PEW RESEARCH CENTER, RELIGION A STRENGTH
AND WEAKNESS FOR BOTH PARTIES: PUBLIC DIVIDED ON ORIGINS OF LIFE 10-11 (2005), available
at http://people-press.org/reports/display.php3?ReportD=254 ("White evangelicals and black
Protestants are the only religious groups expressing majority support for teaching creationism
instead of evolution in public schools."); see also id. at 8 ("Among religious groups, white
evangelical Protestants are most distinctive in their support for the creationist position."). As a
result, governmental preference for this viewpoint threatens to run afoul of the most basic
Establishment Clause principle, namely that the State may not prefer a particular religion over
another. See infra notes 44-51 and accompanying text.
20. Although not the focus of this Article, there is no apparent reason why the suggestions
contained herein for evaluating facially neutral evolution disclaimers are not equally applicable to
other facially neutral provisions challenged under the Establishment Clause.
21. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
22. See McLean v. Ark. Bd. of Educ., 529 F. Supp. 1255, 1258-59 (E.D. Ark. 1982)
(explaining that "[tihe religious movement known as Fundamentalism began in nineteenth century
America as part of evangelical Protestantism's response to social changes, new religious thought
and Darwinism. . . . Following World War I ... Fundamentalism focused on evolution as
[Vol. 60:423
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Florida, and Oklahoma all banned the teaching of evolution in public
schools,23 but it was the Tennessee Supreme Court that staged the first,
and perhaps most well-known, legal battle on the subject. The court
upheld a Tennessee statute prohibiting the teaching of evolution, thereby
providing creationists with their first (and only) legal victory in the fight
over evolution instruction. 24 Although the decision was followed by the
enactment of similar statutes in Mississippi and Arkansas, 25 relative leg-
islative quiet ensued. No new anti-evolution legislation was passed after
1928, and the issue was largely relegated to local attempts to discourage
the teaching of evolution.26
The debate resurfaced in 1968, when the Supreme Court struck
down an Arkansas statute prohibiting teaching that humankind
"'ascended or descended from a lower order of animals .... 27 This
decision changed the way anti-evolutionists sought to influence educa-
tion policy. 28 Precluded from banning evolution from public schools
altogether, anti-evolutionists sought a new, legally permissible way to
combat evolution instruction. They chose "scientific creationism," the
viewpoint that the biblical creation account can be supported scientifi-
cally.29 The preferred method of promoting scientific creationism was
responsible for [a perceived decline in traditional morality]"); Derek H. Davis, Kansas Versus
Darwin: Examining the History and Future of the Creationism-Evolution Controversy in
American Public Schools, 9 KAN. J.L. & PUB. PoL'Y 205, 210-12 (1999) (describing the conflict
between Darwinism and the rise to prominence of Christian fundamentalism in the early twentieth
century).
23. See Coyne, supra note 16, at 22 (listing the three states that passed anti-evolution statutes
prior to Scopes: Florida, Oklahoma, and Tennessee).
24. See Scopes v. State, 278 S.W. 57 (Tenn. 1925), rev'd on other grounds, 289 S.W. 363
(Tenn. 1927). The statute at issue in Scopes prohibited public school teachers in Dayton,
Tennessee from offering any instruction on the origins of humankind that denied divine creation
in favor of a theory that humans were descended from lower-order animals. See Scopes, 289 S.W.
at 363 (referring to the defendant's "violation of chapter 27 of the Public Acts of 1925," known as
the "Anti-Evolution Act").
25. See Coyne, supra note 16, at 22 ("In the wake of Scopes, anti-evolution laws were passed
in Mississippi and Arkansas, adding to those passed by Florida and Oklahoma in 1923.").
26. See Reule, supra note 13, at 2570.
27. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 99 (1968).
28. For purposes of this discussion, the phrase "anti-evolutionists" will be used
interchangeably with "creationists" to describe individuals who believe that the biblical story of
creation should be taught in public schools. See Coyne, supra note 16, at 22 (explaining that after
Epperson, "[t]he opponents of evolution proceeded to rethink their strategy, deciding that if they
could not beat scientists, they would join them. They thus recast themselves as 'scientific
creationists,' proposing an ostensibly non-religious alternative to the theory of evolution that
might be acceptable in the classroom"); Chris Mooney, The Dover Monkey Trial, SEED, Oct.-Nov.
2005, at 31 ("In the wake of [Epperson], the anti-evolutionist legal strategy advocated 'equal
time' legislation .... ").
29. See McLean v. Ark. Bd. of Educ., 529 F. Supp. 1255, 1259 (E.D. Ark. 1982) ("In the
1960's and early 1970's, several Fundamentalist organizations were formed to promote the idea
that the Book of Genesis was supported by scientific data. The terms 'creation science' and
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through balanced-treatment legislation. 30 Balanced-treatment legislation
did not prohibit evolution instruction, but instead required that creation-
ism and evolution be taught in equal measure.3' In 1981, Arkansas
adopted a balanced-treatment statute that was promptly challenged and
invalidated on First Amendment grounds by a federal district court.32
Five years later, the Supreme Court invalidated a similar statute.33 With
balanced-treatment legislation joining bans on evolution instruction as
unconstitutional, anti-evolutionists were again forced to seek new meth-
ods of combating evolution instruction in public schools.
These new methods can be described generally as the Wedge Strat-
egy.3 4 The Wedge Strategy challenges evolution instruction by promot-
ing alternatives that are "consonant with Christian and theistic
convictions."35 Since 1999, the Wedge Strategy has been pursued
through two general approaches. 36 The first is the revision of state sci-
ence standards.37 While not prohibiting evolution instruction, revised
standards discourage schools from teaching evolution by endorsing text-
books that omit it and by excluding evolution from standardized tests.38
Although Kansas, Mississippi, West Virginia, and Tennessee have at
one time adopted this approach,39 there are currently no states that omit
'scientific creationism' have been adopted by these Fundamentalists as descriptive of their study
of creation and the origins of man.").
30. Mooney, supra note 28, at 31 ("In the wake of [Epperson], the anti-evolutionist legal
strategy began to advocate 'equal time' legislation.").
31. See McLean, 529 F. Supp. at 1261-63; Reule, supra note 13, at 2573 (explaining that the
balanced treatment legislation at issue in McLean was "specifically designed to avoid conflict with
the First Amendment" in light of Epperson).
32. McLean, 529 F. Supp. at 1255 (invalidating the Balanced Treatment for Creation-Science
and Evolution Science Act, ARK. CODE ANN. § 80-1663 (1981 Supp.)).
33. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987) (invalidating the Louisiana Balanced
Treatment for Creation-Science and Evolution-Science in Public School Instruction Act, LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 17:286.1 - 17:286.7 (1981)).
34. See Center for the Renewal of Science and Culture, The Wedge Strategy, http://www.
antievolution.org/features/wedge.html (last visited Dec. 22, 2005); Coyne, supra note 16, at 32
(discussing the "wedge strategy").
35. Center for the Renewal of Science and Culture, The Wedge Strategy, http://www.
antievolution.org/features/wedge.html (last visited Dec. 22, 2005).
36. See Reule, supra note 13, at 2581-88.
37. See id.
38. The removal of evolution from standardized tests is an increasingly effective disincentive
in light of President Bush's "No Child Left Behind" education reform, which relies heavily on
standardized test scores to allocate federal funding. See No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub.
L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (2002).
39. See American Geological Institute, Government Affairs Program, Evolution Debate in
Kansas, http://www.agiweb.org/gap/evolution/KS.html (last visited Oct. 17, 2005) (recounting the
Kansas State Board of Education's 1999 decision "to change education standards such that
teachers were no longer required to teach evolutionary principles"); Lawrence S. Lerner, Teaching
Evolution State by State, FREETHOUGHT TODAY, Jan.-Feb. 2001, available at http://www.ffrf.org/
fttoday/2001/jan-febOl/lerner.html (explaining that, as of February 2001, four states (Kansas,
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all treatment of evolutionary theory from their science curricula.4 °
Since 2001, the most prominent approach to combating evolution
instruction has been the movement to "teach the controversy," either by
teaching alternate explanations of human origins4" or through evolution
disclaimers. Evolution disclaimers are statements read by school offi-
cials or placed in science textbooks that question the validity of evolu-
tionary theory. In some cases, they suggest alternate explanations or
encourage students to seek their own. Evolutionists consider disclaimers
particularly worrisome because they offer a broader range of options for
discrediting evolution.4 2 Unlike alternative explanations of human ori-
gins, evolution disclaimers do not claim to be limited to a particular
substantive doctrine. They seek only to criticize evolution, and therefore
are able to remain facially neutral by avoiding references to sectarian or
Mississippi, Tennessee, and West Virginia) had state science standards that "ignore evolution
completely").
40. As of December, 2005, however, five states-Florida, Kentucky, Mississippi, Oklahoma,
and South Dakota-had standards that used the term "evolution" either sparingly or not at all,
instead choosing phrases such as "change over time." PAUL R. GROSS, Tim STATE OF STATE
SCMENCE STANDARDS 15, 34, 40, 46-47, 57, 61 (2005), available at http://www.edexcellence.net/
doc/Science%20Standards.FinalFinal.pdf. As many as thirteen states had adopted a treatment of
evolution described as "useless, disguised, or absent." Id. at 15. Moreover, Kansas revised its
state science standards on November 8, 2005. The new standards are critical of evolution and
redefine science to include non-natural explanations for observable phenomena. See id. at 39
(reducing Kansas' grade from "C" to "F' based on its adoption of state science standards "whose
treatment of evolutionary material has been radically compromised"); see also Wilgoren, supra
note 2 (describing the new standards); Overbye, supra note 2 ("In the course of revising the state's
science standards to include criticism of evolution, the board promulgated a new definition of
science itself."). The new standards are not expected, however, to have a significant effect on the
way science is taught in Kansas classrooms. See Rothschild, supra note 2 ("For all the hue and
cry, the vote will have no immediate practical impact on teaching science in Kansas classrooms,
officials said.").
41. Proposals requiring public schools to teach alternative explanations of human origins-in
particular intelligent design-are currently being entertained in at least 10 states. See American
Geological Institute, Government Affairs Program, Evolution Debate in Kansas, http://www.
agiweb.org/gap/legisl08/evolutionKScont.html (last visited Oct. 17, 2005) (describing current
efforts in Pennsylvania, Ohio, Michigan, Wisconsin, Wyoming, Kansas, Missouri, Mississippi,
Alabama, and Georgia to introduce alternate theories of human origins into science classrooms).
Intelligent design is popular among wedge strategists because it provides a substantive and
ostensibly secular explanation of human origins independent of evolution. See Coyne, supra note
16, at 32 (quoting proponents of intelligent design explaining that the advantage of intelligent
design for anti-evolutionists is that it gets "the Bible and the Book of Genesis out of the debate"
on the teaching of human origins in public schools). This popularity may wane, however, in the
face of a recent district court decision holding that intelligent design is a religious, not a scientific,
doctrine that may not be taught in public schools. See Kitzmiller v. Dover Area Sch. Dist., 400 F.
Supp. 2d 707, 745 (M.D. Pa. 2005) ("It is our . . . conclusion that [intelligent design] is an
interesting theological argument, but that it is not science.").
42. See GROSS, supra note 40, at 15 (citing disclaimers as the primary means of response by
anti-evolutionists seeking to discredit evolution); Rauber, supra note 17, at Al (explaining that
"the tactic that most worries supporters of evolution is the use of anti-evolution disclaimers
inserted into science textbooks").
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quasi-sectarian doctrines such as creationism or intelligent design. This
perceived advantage has led anti-evolutionists to persist in developing
new disclaimers despite the fact that previous measures have failed con-
stitutional scrutiny.43 With the emergence of disclaimers as the primary
means of combating evolution instruction in public schools, it is essen-
tial to take a critical view of the legal standards by which they are ana-
lyzed under the Establishment Clause.
HI.
A discussion of the proper doctrinal approach to resolving a consti-
tutional question necessarily implicates the scope and meaning of the
underlying constitutional provision. In the case of the Establishment
Clause, this is no small matter. For more than 200 years, its proper
interpretation and application have been the source of vigorous debate
and controversy." Thomas Jefferson and James Madison, perhaps the
two most prominent contributors to the Establishment Clause, wrote of a
complete separation between matters of religion and government.45
43. For example, Louisiana introduced a disclaimer that was struck down by the Fifth Circuit.
See Freiler v. Tangipahoa Parish Bd. of Educ., 185 F.3d 337 (5th Cir. 1999). Rather than abandon
disclaimers altogether, a number of states have either adopted or considered adopting revised
disclaimers in hopes of curing the infirmities that the Fifth Circuit considered fatal. See Selman v.
Cobb County Sch. Dist., 390 F. Supp. 2d 1286 (N.D. Ga. 2005) (invalidating disclaimer adopted
by Cobb County, Georgia, school district); Kitzmiller, 400 F. Supp. 2d at 707; Press Release,
American Civil Liberties Union, ACLU of Arkansas Action Results in Removal of Evolution
Disclaimers From Science Textbooks (Feb. 10, 2005), available at http://www.aclu.org/religion/
schools/16369prs20050210.html (recounting the Beebe School District's (Arkansas) retraction of
its evolution disclaimer); National Center for Science Education, Textbook Disclaimer Proposed
in Shelby County, Feb. 21, 2005, http:/lwww.ncseweb.orglresources/news/2005TN/259textbook
_disclaimer_proposed. i-2 .21L2005.asp (reporting proposal of evolution disclaimer provision in
Shelby County, Tennessee); National Center for Science Education, Evolution in Alabama, Mar.
14, 2005, http://www.ncseweb.org/resources/news/2005/AL/633_evolution-in-alabama 3 14
2005.asp (reporting recent change in Alabama State Board of Education disclaimer and
hypothesizing that the change was "intended to shelter the disclaimer against the sort of legal
challenge that was brought against the disclaimer used in Cobb County, Georgia"); F. Arthur
Jones II, A Creative Solution?: Assessing the Constitutionality of a New Creation/Evolution
Disclaimer, 49 Loy. L. REV. 519, 533-35 (2003) (noting that Georgia and Alabama adopted
disclaimers after Freiler, and that disclaimers in Oklahoma and Louisiana were proposed but
politically defeated).
44. See, e.g., LEONARD W. LEVY, THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE: RELIGION AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT X-xvi (1986).
45. Jefferson wrote that because "religion is a matter which lies solely between man & his
God . . . I contemplate with sovereign reverence the act of the whole American People which
declared that their legislature should 'make no law respecting an establishment of religion .... '
thus building a wall of separation between Church & State." ROBERT L. CORD, SEPARATION OF
CHURCH AND STATE 114-15 (1982). This echoed his earlier sentiments in A Bill for Establishing
Religious Freedom in Virginia, which mandated that "no man shall be compelled to frequent or
support any religious worship, place or ministry whatsoever but that all men shall be free to
profess, and by argument to maintain, their opinions in matters of religion, and that the same shall
in no wise diminish, enlarge or affect their civil capacities." Thomas Jefferson, A Bill for
MAKING LEMONADE
Despite the breadth of their language, the First Amendment was initially
understood to apply only to the federal government.46 It was not until
the emergence of the incorporation doctrine that the Establishment
Clause was applied to state and local governments. 47 Justice Black pro-
vided perhaps the clearest account of the Establishment Clause's modern
scope and meaning:
The 'establishment of religion' clause of the First Amendment means
at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a
church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all reli-
gions, or prefer one religion over another .... Neither a state nor the
Federal Government can, openly or secretly, participate in the affairs
of any religious organizations or groups and vice versa. In the words
of Jefferson, the clause against establishment of religion by law was
intended to erect 'a wall of separation between Church and State.'48
Since Everson, the Court has reiterated that the Establishment Clause
mandates government neutrality regarding religion; the government can-
not grant one religion or religious doctrine preferential status.49 This
requirement has been extended to prohibit governmental preference for
Establishing Religious Freedom, in CORD, supra, at 249, 250. In his Memorial and
Remonstrance, Madison likewise maintained that "in matters of Religion, no man's right is
abridged by the institution of Civil Society and that Religion is wholly exempt from its
cognizance.... [I]f Religion be exempt from the authority of the Society at large, still less can it
be subject to that of the Legislative Body." James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance, in
MELVIN I. UROFSKY, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 212, 214 (2002). He expressed a similar view before
the Virginia Convention on June 12, 1788: "There is not a shadow of right in the general
government to intermeddle with religion. Its least interference with it, would be a most flagrant
usurpation." THE COMPLETE MADISON 306 (Saul K. Padover ed., 1953).
46. See Joseph Story, The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, reprinted in UROFSKY,
supra note 45, at 229, 232 ("[T]he real object of the amendment... [is] to prevent any national
ecclesiastical establishment, which should give to an hierarchy the exclusive patronage of the
national government."); CORD, supra note 45, at 5 (describing the First Amendment as requiring
the "separation of Church and the national State," and explaining that "the separation of Church
and the national State envisioned by the adopters of the First Amendment would leave the matter
of religious establishments or disestablishment to the wisdom of the several States"); LEVY, supra
note 44, at 76 ("[Tlhe prohibition against an establishment of religion-whatever that meant-
applied to Congress only and not to the states.").
47. See Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1947) (incorporating the Establishment
Clause); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925) (incorporating the First Amendment).
48. Everson, 330 U.S. at 15-16; UROFSKY, supra note 45, at 54 (describing Justice Black's
description of the Establishment Clause in Everson as "the root rationale for nearly every
[subsequent] religion case decided by the Court").
49. Jefferson explained as much in his writing on the passage of the Virginia Bill for
Establishing Religious Freedom. See THOMAS JEFFERSON, Autobiography, in THE WRITINGS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 66-67 (Library ed. 1903) (explaining that the bill was "meant to comprehend,
within the mantle of its protection, the Jew and the Gentile, the Christian and Mahometan, the
Hindoo, and Infidel of every denomination"). Madison echoed Jefferson in proclaiming his fear
that "one sect might obtain a pre-eminence, or two combine together and establish a religion to
which they could compel others to conform." I ANNALS OF CONG. 757-58 (Joseph Gayles ed.,
1789-1791).
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religion over non-religion.50 For purposes of this analysis, it is suffi-
cient to assume that the Establishment Clause prohibits the government
from intentionally promoting a particular religion or religious doctrine.5
This modest assumption provides a useful baseline for measuring the
effectiveness of various Establishment Clause standards in evaluating
evolution disclaimers.
A. The Lemon Test
Decisions associated with evolution instruction in public schools
have employed a variety of tests and standards under the rubric of the
Establishment Clause. Each of these tests, however, suffers from inher-
ent flaws that are often magnified within the context of facially neutral
evolution disclaimers. In Epperson v. Arkansas,52 a high school science
teacher successfully challenged an Arkansas statute that prohibited
50. See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 703 (1994) (describing as "a principle at
the heart of the Establishment Clause, that government should not prefer one religion to another,
or religion to irreligion"); Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 216 (1963) (explaining that the
Court has "rejected unequivocally the contention that the Establishment Clause forbids only
government preference of one religion over another"); see also Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors
of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 872 n.1 (1995) (Souter, J., dissenting) (stating that the view that the
Establishment Clause only forbids governmental preference of one religion over another "was lost
long ago, for 'this Court has rejected unequivocally the contention that the Establishment Clause
forbids only governmental preference of one religion over another"' (quoting Schempp, 374 U.S.
at 216)). But see Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 854-55 (Thomas, J., concurring) (describing the
proposition that the Establishment Clause prohibits preference of religion over non-religion as a
matter of ongoing debate, citing scholarship advocating both sides of that debate).
To the extent they represent a governmental preference for or advancement of religion,
evolution disclaimers represent the promotion of one religion over another, not only the
advancement of religion in general over non-religion. Many denominations, including the Roman
Catholic Church, do not take issue with evolution instruction. See, e.g., Nicole Winfield, Vatican:
Faithful Should Listen to Science, WASH. POST, Nov. 4, 2005, available at http://www.templeton.
org/topicsjinthe news/051104-Yahoo-Vatican.pdf (recounting statements by Pope John Paul II
that "the faithful have an obligation to listen to that which secular modem science has to offer"
and that evolution is "more than just a hypothesis" because there is proof supporting it). Criticism
of evolution and sectarian views of human origins are primarily evangelical Christian pursuits.
THE PEW RESEARCH CENTER, RELIGION A STRENGTH AND WEAKNESS FOR BoTH PARrIES:
PUBLIc DIVIDED ON ORIGINS OF LIFE 7, 10-11 (2005) available at http://people-press.org/reports/
display.php3?ReportlD=254 ("Among religious groups, white evangelical Protestants are most
distinctive in their support for the creationist position. . . . White evangelicals and black
Protestants are the only religious groups expressing majority support for teaching creationism
instead of evolution in public schools."). Consequently, governmental preference for this
viewpoint runs afoul of the most basic Establishment Clause principle-the State cannot prefer a
particular religion over another.
51. Although most Establishment Clause discussions focus on religious consequences, rather
than legislative purpose, see discussion supra notes 46-51 and accompanying text, a finding of
religious intent would only make a provision more constitutionally suspect. Hence, the
assumption that the Establishment Clause prohibits legislation that successfully and purposefully
advances religion is, hopefully, uncontroversial.
52. 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
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evolution instruction. The Supreme Court explained that a statute vio-
lates the Establishment Clause if it is "hostile to," or works to "aid,
foster, or promote" one religion over another, or religion over nonreli-
gion.53 It then invalidated Arkansas' evolution ban on the grounds that
the state legislature's "fundamentalist sectarian" motivation in enacting
the statute was inconsistent with the First Amendment's religious neu-
trality requirement.54 Epperson laid the groundwork for the Lemon test
and, more specifically, for the Court's approach to evolution cases.
The Lemon test is the product of the Supreme Court's decision in
Lemon v. Kurtzman.55 Although Lemon did not explicitly address the
issue of evolution in public schools, it established the three-part test that
remains the controlling standard in evolution instruction cases.5 6 Lemon
involved challenges to statutes from Pennsylvania and Rhode Island on
the grounds that they unconstitutionally provided federal funding to
religious schools.57 In formulating its analysis, the Court drew on the
"cumulative criteria" of its Establishment Clause jurisprudence to arrive
at a three-part test. 58 In order to survive Establishment Clause scrutiny,
the Court held that a statute must: (1) have a secular purpose (the "pur-
pose prong"); (2) produce a principle or primary effect that neither
advances nor inhibits religion (the "effects prong"); and (3) not foster
excessive governmental entanglement with religion (the "entanglement
prong").59 In applying the purpose prong, the Court found no basis to
conclude that either legislature sought to promote religion. It relied on
the fact that the language of both statutes included explicit secular pur-
poses, and on the principle that a legislature's stated purpose merits
"appropriate deference."6 ° Without addressing the effects prong, the
Court struck down the statutes under the entanglement prong. It held
that the statutes fostered impermissible governmental involvement with
religion because they required state enforcement to ensure that federal
subsidies were limited to secular activities.
61
The Lemon test is under-inclusive with respect to evolution dis-
53. Id. at 104.
54. Id. at 108-09.
55. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
56. See Tangipahoa Parish Bd. of Educ. v. Freiler, 530 U.S. 1251 (2000), denying cert. to
Freiler v. Tangipahoa Parish Bd. of Educ., 185 F.3d 337 (5th Cir. 1999) (acknowledging the
applicability of the Lemon test in an evolution disclaimer case); Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S.
578, 582-83 (1987) (relying on the Lemon test to resolve a constitutional challenge to an evolution
disclaimer); Selman v. Cobb County Sch. Dist., 390 F. Supp. 2d 1286 (N.D. Ga. 2005) (same).
57. See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 607-11.
58. Id. at 612.
59. Id. at 612-13.
60. Id. at 613 (citing Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 248 (1968)).
61. See id. at 614.
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claimers. The Court's application of the purpose prong reveals a low
threshold; a statute is unconstitutional only if it is found to have no secu-
lar purpose.62 The Lemon Court did not explicitly require that legisla-
tures state their purpose, but if they do, it held that such statements are
entitled to judicial deference. 63 Even reading a requirement of authen-
ticity or validity into this standard, a clear statement of a secular legisla-
tive purpose is sufficient to survive Establishment Clause scrutiny in all
but those cases where the stated purpose is obviously pretextual. 6 This
standard is under-inclusive for at least two reasons. First, it permits stat-
utes with a significant or even primary religious purpose, provided they
proffer any secular aim. It is likewise under-inclusive because it is so
easily circumvented. Lawmakers need only identify one plausible, secu-
lar legislative purpose to ensure that a provision with the actual intent of
advancing religion will survive constitutional scrutiny. 65 Judicial defer-
ence to statements of legislative intent exacerbates this under-inclusive-
ness, as do facially neutral evolution disclaimers, which are extremely
difficult to identify as having a purely sectarian purpose due to the
absence of any explicit religious references.
The effects prong is also under-inclusive, because it applies only
where the primary consequence of a statute is to advance or inhibit relig-
ion. It fails to account for cases where the primacy of a particular statu-
tory consequence may be difficult to measure or easy to disguise. Like
the purpose prong, the effects prong's under-inclusiveness is magnified
when applied to facially neutral disclaimers. Finally, the entanglement
prong is narrow. It prohibits only those statutes that are inappropriately
entangled with religion or that coerce religious participation.66 Because
disclaimers typically only require governmental involvement at their
inception, rather than ongoing enforcement efforts, they are unlikely to
implicate the entanglement prong.
Considered in its entirety, the Lemon test is under-inclusive because
62. See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 56 (1985) (explaining that the purpose prong
does not prohibit a statute that is "motivated in part by a religious purpose," but only one which
"is entirely motivated by a purpose to advance religion").
63. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 613.
64. See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 586-87 (1987) ("While the Court is normally
deferential to a State's articulation of a secular purpose, it is required that the statement of such
purpose be sincere and not a sham.").
65. This is not to say that a statute's actual or primary purpose is the appropriate measure of
constitutionality, see infra Part 1H B, but only to point out that the First Amendment's prohibition
against an establishment of religion should not necessarily be limited to statutes with no
defensible secular goal.
66. This prong has been interpreted both as an extension of the effects test and as similar to
Justice Kennedy's coercion test. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587 (1992) (articulating the
standard referred to as the "coercion test," which states that "government may not coerce anyone
to support or participate in religion or its exercise").
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it prohibits only those statutes that either have no secular purpose, have
as their primary effect the advancement of religion, or inextricably inter-
twine religion with government. This limited scope renders the Lemon
test incapable of adequately enforcing the Establishment Clause's relig-
ious neutrality requirement. The test permits a broad category of dis-
claimers-including facially neutral disclaimers-that purposefully and
successfully promote religion without having an obviously predominant
sectarian purpose or effect. Perhaps for this reason, courts evaluating
evolution statutes since Lemon have interpreted its prohibitions broadly
to invalidate provisions that, while perhaps unconstitutional establish-
ments of religion, do not violate the letter of the test.
B. Legislative Motivation Standard
Despite the Lemon test's ostensibly clear and objective standards,
courts applying it in the evolution context have interpreted it to effec-
tively create a new, more stringent standard. With respect to the purpose
prong, courts have focused on whether the legislature's actual intent or
motivation in enacting a statute was to promote religion. In McLean v.
Arkansas Board of Education,67 the court used the purpose prong to
invalidate Arkansas' balanced-treatment statute.68 Absent an explicit
statement of legislative purpose, the court relied on statements made by
the statute's sponsors and on the State's historical treatment of evolution
to conclude that the statute was part of a "religious crusade ... moti-
vated by opposition to the theory of evolution and [a] desire to see [crea-
tionism] taught in the public schools. ' ' 6' This religious motivation was
deemed sufficient to invalidate Arkansas' balancing statute on the
grounds that it was passed with the "specific purpose" of advancing
religion.7° The Supreme Court reviewed a similar balancing statute in
Edwards v. Aguillard.7" Despite citing to the Lemon test's authority in
Establishment Clause cases,72 the Court chose not to focus on the test's
literal requirement of a single, valid secular purpose. Like the court of
appeals before it, the Edwards Court relied on legislative motivation to
invalidate the statute.73 Edwards and McLean thus broadened Lemon's
67. 529 F. Supp. 1255 (E.D. Ark. 1982).
68. Id. at 1264, 1274.
69. Id. at 1263.
70. Id. at 1264.
71. 482 U.S. 578 (1987).
72. See id. at 582-83, n.4.
73. See id. at 591 (explaining that the statute could not withstand constitutional scrutiny
because its "preeminent purpose . . . was clearly to advance the religious viewpoint that a
supernatural being created humankind"). The Court explained that the purpose prong prohibited
statutes intended to advance religion. Id. at 585. Acknowledging that courts are normally
deferential to a stated legislative purpose, the Court found that the Act did not advance
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purpose prong beyond its literal, objective meaning toward a more sub-
jective inquiry into whether the lawmakers' primary motivation was
religious.74
This shift in favor of actual legislative motivation is significant
because it represents an attempt to remedy the purpose prong's under-
inclusiveness through the adoption of a new standard that is even more
flawed. As an initial matter, legislative motivation is generally too elu-
sive to constitute a workable constitutional standard.75 This is especially
apparent when applied to provisions, like evolution disclaimers, that are
facially neutral. A legislative motivation test is also inadequate because
it is both over and under-inclusive. It is over-inclusive because the
impetus for adopting a particular statute may not be reflected in, or even
relevant to, the subject matter of the statute. Individual legislators are
not-nor, as a practical matter, could they be-constitutionally required
to divorce themselves from their religious beliefs when acting in their
capacity as lawmakers.76 As a result, those beliefs may inform any or all
of their political decisions, regardless of whether the statute or issue at
hand is religious. 77 For example, under a legislative motivation stan-
Louisiana's stated purpose of promoting academic freedom. Id. at 589 ("[T]he Act does not serve
to protect academic freedom, but has the distinctly different purpose of discrediting 'evolution by
counterbalancing its teaching at every turn with the teaching of creationism.'" (citation omitted)).
In support, the Court cited the legislative history, which indicated that the Louisiana legislature
sought to promote creationism. See id. at 587, 591-93, 592 nn.12-14.
74. The Edwards dissenters recognized this departure. As Justice Scalia pointed out, Lemon's
secular purpose threshold has traditionally been quite low, and Establishment Clause
jurisprudence does not require that legislation be invalidated solely because legislators acted in
accordance with their religious convictions. See id. at 633-34 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice
Scalia accused the majority of departing from Lemon and invalidating the act because it
demonstrated a "discriminatory preference for the teaching of creation science." Id. at 630.
75. See Edwards, 482 U.S. at 638 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[D]etermining the subjective intent
of legislators is a perilous enterprise. It is perilous, I might note, not just for the judges who will
very likely reach the wrong result, but also for the legislators who find that they must assess the
validity of proposed legislation-and risk the condemnation of having voted for an
unconstitutional measure-not on the basis of what the legislation contains, nor even on the basis
of what they themselves intend, but on the basis of what others have in mind." (citations
omitted)); see also Arizona v. California, 283 U.S. 423, 455 (1931) ("Into the motives which
induced members of Congress to [act] ... this court may not inquire."); Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S.
87 (1810) ("In a contest between two individuals, claiming under an act of a legislature, the court
cannot inquire into the motives which actuated the members of that legislature. If the legislature
might constitutionally pass such an act; if the act be clothed with all the requisite forms of a law, a
court, sitting as a court of law, cannot sustain a suit between individuals founded on the allegation
that the act is a nullity in consequence of the impure motives which influenced certain members of
the legislature which passed the law.")
76. In fact, many elected officials achieve their positions, at least in part, on the strength of
their religious convictions. See, e.g., Robert Barnes, A Triumph for Warner, and a Guide for His
Party, WASH. PosT, Nov. 9, 2005, at Al (discussing the importance of religious faith in 2005
elections); David Broder, Need to Connect with Religious, Rural Voters Noted, WASH. POST, Nov.
4, 2004, at A35 (discussing the importance of faith in the 2004 presidential election).
77. This is not to take a position in the longstanding discussion of the proper role of religion
[Vol. 60:423
MAKING LEMONADE
dard, a murder statute could run afoul of the Establishment Clause sim-
ply because its enactment was motivated by the legislature's desire to
promote the religious doctrine that murder is against God's will. To
invalidate the statute on those grounds would not only create immeasur-
able confusion and uncertainty in the law, but would stretch the Estab-
lishment Clause's reach beyond the bounds of assuring religious
neutrality and into political speech. The same principle applies to evolu-
tion disclaimers. The fact that a disclaimer may be religiously motivated
cannot make that disclaimer per se unconstitutional. Any other conclu-
sion would not only lead to potentially absurd results, but would shift
the constitutional inquiry from whether government is impermissibly
establishing religion to whether religion is a motivating force behind the
actions of individual legislators. While the latter could certainly be evi-
dence of the former, it alone is not sufficient to invalidate a statute.
The legislative motivation test is also under-inclusive. As judicial
focus on legislative motivation becomes more apparent, lawmakers are
able to conceal their motivations by drafting facially neutral statutes and
creating legislative records that highlight secular justifications. The
result is a new class of provisions that are motivated by religious con-
cerns and that have a religious effect, but that do not contain language
that betrays that intent or effect. A carefully formulated statute could
thus survive the prevailing interpretation of the purpose prong despite
having the same religious purpose and effect as its unconstitutional pred-
ecessors. Therefore, while a literal reading of Lemon's purpose prong is
under-inclusive, the legislative motivation test is perhaps even more
severely flawed.
C. The Effects/Endorsement Test in Disclaimer Cases
Like the evolution cases that preceded them, cases involving evolu-
tion disclaimers have cited Lemon as the controlling constitutional stan-
in political decision making. See generally Robert Audi, The Place of Religious Argument in a
Free and Democratic Society, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 677 (1993) (arguing that "[r]eligious
arguments may properly play a variety of roles in liberal democracies"); RELIGION AND THE
LIBERAL POLITY (Terence Cuneo ed., 2005) (advocating for religious inclusivism in political
deliberation); KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS AND POLITICAL CHOICE 30 (1988)
(noting that it is "self-evident to most seriously religious persons" that "[rieligious convictions of
the sort familiar in this society bear pervasively on people's ethical choices, including choices
about laws and government policies"); Stephen Macedo, Liberal Civic Education and Religious
Fundamentalism: The Case of God v. John Rawls?, 105 ETHICS 468, 475 (1995) (arguing that
public decision making and discourse should be performed "in terms of reasons and arguments
that can be shared with reasonable people whose religious and other ultimate commitments
differ"); JOHN RAWLS, POLITCAL LIBERALISM 212 (1993) (discussing the proper role of religion in
a political society's decisions, formulation of plans, and prioritization of results). For purposes of
this discussion, it is enough to note that legislative motivation by itself is insufficient to establish
constitutionality.
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dard, but have deviated from its literal meaning. Unlike their
predecessors, however, these disclaimer cases relied primarily on
Lemon's effects prong in reaching their conclusions. Freiler v.
Tangipahoa Parish Board of Education78 involved a disclaimer that was
required to be read to students prior to their studying evolution in sci-
ence class.7 9 The disclaimer stated that the teaching of evolution was
not intended to discourage their belief in the "Biblical version of Crea-
tion" or any other concept of human origins, and encouraged students to
form their own opinions or adhere to those of their parents.8 0 The dis-
trict court, applying Lemon's purpose prong, relied on the legislative
motivation standard used in McLean and Edwards to strike down the
disclaimer.8 The Fifth Circuit affirmed, but on different grounds.8"
The appellate court applied the literal language of Lemon's purpose
prong, explaining that a provision must only have one sincere, secular
purpose to survive scrutiny.83 "Treat[ing] the School Board's three-fold
articulation of purpose with deference," the court concluded that the dis-
claimer met this standard.84 The court then went on to apply Lemon's
effects prong.85 It held that the disclaimer violated the effects prong
because the "benefit to religion conferred by the reading of the
Tangipahoa disclaimer is more than indirect, remote, or incidental."86
Like the legislative-motivation analysis, this approach is not only a
departure from precedent, it is fatally flawed.
As an initial matter, the standard articulated by the Fifth Circuit in
Freiler is overbroad. Legislation cannot be unconstitutional simply
78. 975 F. Supp. 819 (E.D. La. 1997), aftd, 185 F.3d 337 (5th Cir. 1999).
79. Id. at 821.
80. Id.
81. Relying on the Supreme Court's statement in Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985), that
a statute is unconstitutional "'if it is entirely motivated by a purpose to advance religion,"'
Freiler, 975 F. Supp. at 827 (quoting Wallace, 472 U.S. at 57), the district court concluded that
the disclaimer at issue violated the Establishment Clause because it was "motivated" by "religious
concerns." Id. at 830. In support of this conclusion, the district court pointed to statements by the
resolution's sponsor that his goal in introducing the resolution was to promote creationism. See
id. at 829.
82. Freiler v. Tangipahoa Parish Bd. of Educ., 185 F.3d 337 (5th Cir. 1999).
83. Id. at 344 ("If the disclaimer furthers just one of its proffered purposes and if that same
purpose proves to be secular, then the disclaimer survives scrutiny under Lemon's first prong.").
84. Id. at 344-45.
85. Id. at 346. The court likened the effects prong of the Lemon test to the endorsement test
applied by the Supreme Court in County of Allegheny v. ACLU of Greater Pittsburgh Chapter,
492 U.S. 573 (1989), and referred to the two interchangeably in its analysis. Freiler, 185 F.3d at
346; see also Kitzmiller v. Dover Area Sch. Dist., 400 F. Supp. 2d 707, 713 (M.D. Pa. 2005)
("[T]he [endorsement] test is most closely associated with Lemon's 'effect prong.' ").
86. Freiler, 185 F.3d at 348. In support of this conclusion, the court cited the disclaimer's
juxtaposition of its criticism of evolution with its urging students to contemplate alternate theories,
its reminder that students may maintain the beliefs of their parents, and its presentation of the
biblical version of creation as the only enumerated alternative to evolution. Id. at 346.
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because it has a single, non-negligible religious effect.87 Nevertheless,
Freiler held that a provision's constitutionality depends on the religious
nature of each of its social consequences, regardless of the relative
weight of those consequences and whether they were intended or even
foreseeable by the legislature. This standard is over-inclusive because it
threatens a wide range of secular statutes and could create a significant
chilling effect on the legislative process that is not contemplated by the
Establishment Clause.
The Freiler court's decision is also under-inclusive to the extent it
relies on the specific language of the disclaimer.88 Just as a standard
based on legislative motivation is vulnerable to manipulation of the leg-
islative record, a focus on sectarian statutory language is also easily
manipulated by altering the form and text of the disclaimer. This danger
is most readily apparent in facially neutral disclaimers.
Building on the court's reasoning in Freiler, Georgia's Cobb
County school board adopted a facially neutral disclaimer to be placed
in science textbooks. The disclaimer, which was challenged in Selman
v. Cobb County School District,89 stated that evolution "is a theory, not a
fact," and "should be approached with an open mind, studied carefully,
and critically considered."9 ° The Selman court concluded that the Cobb
County disclaimer satisfied Lemon's purpose prong because, unlike the
disclaimer in Freiler, the Cobb County disclaimer did not refer to any
religious alternatives to evolution. 91 The court then considered whether
87. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §16-20, at 1512 (2d ed. 1988)
(noting the danger in federal courts becoming "deeply enmeshed in the machinery of state and
local government, reviewing equal protection challenges to seemingly neutral government
choices"); see also Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 489 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("It
would indeed be undesirable for this Court to consider every conceivable situation which might
possibly arise in the application of complex and comprehensive legislation. Nor are we so ready
to frustrate the expressed will of Congress or that of the state legislatures." (citation omitted)).
88. See Freiler, 185 F.3d at 348 (striking down disclaimer, at least in part, for its explicit
reference to the biblical version of creation).
89. 390 F. Supp. 2d 1286 (N.D. Ga. 2005).
90. Id. at 1292.
91. Id. at 1302 ("[T]he Sticker in this case does not contain a reference to religion in general,
any particular religion, or any religious theory. This weighs heavily in favor of upholding the
Sticker as constitutional."); accord Adler v. Duval Cty. Sch. Bd., 206 F.3d 1070, 1084 (11 th Cir.
2000) ("For the most part, statutes which the Supreme Court has invalidated for lack of secular
purpose have openly favored religion or demonstrated a religious purpose on their face.").
Although the Selman court found that the promotion of critical thinking was a sufficiently valid
secular purpose to satisfy the first prong of Lemon, the court continued the judicial trend toward
expanding the reach of the Lemon test by applying a modified version of the purpose prong. It
analyzed what it deemed the "primary" purpose of the disclaimer-the reduction of offense to
anti-evolutionist students and parents. Selman, 390 F. Supp. 2d at 1303-04. Relying on testimony
from board members, the court concluded that the board adopted the disclaimer to "placate their
constituents and to communicate to them that students' personal beliefs would be respected and
tolerated in the classroom." Id. at 1303. The court acknowledged that the decision to adopt the
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the disclaimer satisfied Lemon's effects test. Rather than rely on the
literal language of that standard, however, the Selman court substituted
the endorsement test articulated in County of Allegheny v. ACLU
Greater Pittsburgh Chapter.9 2 It described the endorsement test as
prohibiting any statement that, when viewed by a reasonable observer
who is familiar with the statement's historical and cultural context, con-
veys a message of government endorsement of religion.93 Citing this
standard, the court invalidated the Cobb County disclaimer because it
conveyed the message that those who "oppose evolution for religious
reasons ... are favored members of the political community .... In
reaching this conclusion, the court focused on the community's relig-
iously motivated support for the disclaimer and the fact that its language
"mirrors the viewpoint of these religiously motivated citizens."" It
found that a reasonable observer would be aware of certain citizens'
religious reasons for supporting the disclaimer and the school board's
interest-despite not having similar religious motivations-of appeasing
its religiously motivated constituents. 96 Regardless of whether it led to
the proper constitutional result, this analysis is inadequate to judge
future disclaimers.
Taken one way, the court's analysis amounts to little more than the
legislative-motivation standard adopted in earlier evolution cases. By
assuming that a reasonable observer is intimately familiar with the per-
sonal opinions and motivations of individual legislators, the court obvi-
ates any distinction between "observing" the religious effects of a
statutory provision and evaluating the legislature's motivation.97 Read
another way, the analysis is deficient because it focuses on the political
motivations for the provision's adoption, which does not require a find-
ing that the disclaimer itself has any religious connection whatsoever.
By this rationale, a provision promoted by the local citizens for religious
purposes and enacted by a legislative body in acknowledgment of that
popular support would violate Lemon's effects test by giving the reason-
able observer the impression that the local government favors religion.
disclaimer was "influenced by sectarian interests," but determined that the disclaimer at issue
served only as an accommodation of religion and did not serve the purpose of advancing it in
violation of Lemon's purpose prong. Id. at 1304.
92. 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
93. Selman, 390 F. Supp. 2d at 1305. The Selman court went on to explain that unlike the
subjective analysis embodied in Lemon's purpose prong, the effects test inquiry is "'in large part a
legal question to be answered on the basis of judicial interpretation of social facts."' Id. at 1306
(quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 693-94 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
94. Id. at 1306.
95. Id. at 1307.
96. Id.
97. See discussion supra notes 74-85 and accompanying text.
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This conflates voters' individual motivations and faith with state estab-
lishment of religion. It is not necessarily true (nor, for that matter, par-
ticularly likely) that religiously motivated public support is reliable
evidence of a sectarian policy or provision. Religious convictions form
the foundation of many voters' positions on every aspect of public life.
Equating religiously motivated support from a lawmaker's constituents
with a constitutionally invalid advancement of religion leads to an
exceedingly broad and unworkable interpretation of the Establishment
Clause.
More important than the specific flaws in the court's reasoning in
Selman, however, are the weaknesses in the endorsement test that are
highlighted by its analysis. Because the endorsement test is dependent
on the perceptions of a hypothetical reasonable observer, the outcome of
a review applying that test depends heavily on the amount and type of
information attributed to that hypothetical person. Although the term
reasonable observer is not entirely without definition, 9 the amount of
information available to that observer is determined solely by the court
on a case-by-case basis. In Selman, the court assumed that a reasonable
bystander would be aware of the motivations and desires of not only the
government officials responsible for adopting the disclaimer, but of their
constituents. The result, as explained above, is a standard that is over-
broad because it threatens the viability of any provision that was the
product of legislative or public religious sentiment. The converse, how-
ever, is equally possible and problematic. If a reasonable bystander is
assumed to possess a more limited amount of information, then the test
may become under-inclusive, as the hypothetical observer will not be
sufficiently informed to comprehend the religious implications of the
provision. This is particularly problematic in the context of facially neu-
tral evolution disclaimers, where the language of the disclaimer itself is
less helpful in discerning the disclaimer's religious connections. In
short, the endorsement test is flawed in its treatment of evolution dis-
claimers-in particular facially neutral disclaimers-because it results
in a potentially circular analysis whereby the amount of information
attributed to a hypothetical "reasonable observer" could both dictate and
be influenced by the constitutional outcome. 99
98. See Kitzmiller v. Dover Area Sch. Dist., 400 F. Supp. 2d 707, 715 (M.D. Pa. 2005)
(defining a reasonable observer for purposes of the endorsement test as one that is familiar with
the policy's "legislative history, as well as the history of the community and the broader social and
historical context in which the policy arose").
99. The most recent evolution disclaimer case, Kitzmiller v. Dover Area School District,
reflects the limitations of the endorsement test. In Kitzrniller, the court considered a challenge to a
requirement that school officials read a statement to ninth grade science students that evolution is
"not a fact," and that "[glaps in the theory exist for which there is no evidence." 400 F. Supp. 2d
at 708. The statement also described intelligent design as an alternative to evolution and referred
2006]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60:423
In sum, as demonstrated above, the three primary approaches used
to evaluate evolution cases under the Establishment Clause are each
severely flawed. These inadequacies necessitate an improved method of
evaluating evolution disclaimers-in particular facially neutral disclaim-
ers"°-under the Establishment Clause in order to promote greater
accuracy and stability in the law. 10'
students to the available reference book, Of Pandas and People. Id. at 708-09. The court cited
both the endorsement test and the Lemon test in invalidating the statement. Applying the
endorsement test, the court first concluded that there were two relevant observers to consider-the
reasonable student and reasonable adult citizen in the community. See id. at 722-35. It then
attributed to those reasonable observers an amount of information about the disclaimer's
legislative and political circumstances similar to that in Selman. Id. It concluded that a
reasonable observer would understand the individual religious motivations of the drafters and of
the proponents of intelligent design generally. See id. at 728 ("An objective student is also
presumed to know that the Dover School Board advocated for the ...disclaimer in expressly
religious terms ... and that the Board adopted the [intelligent design] policy in furtherance of an
expressly religious agenda .... [T]he objective student is presumed to know that encouraging the
teaching of evolution as a theory rather than as a fact is one of the latest strategies to dilute
evolution instruction employed by anti-evolutionists with religious motivations."). It also
concluded that a reasonable observer would understand that intelligent design is not a scientific
concept but is synonymous with creationism, and that its reference book posits that God is the
"'master intellect"' behind human existence. Id. at 718.
The court's analysis in Kitzmiller further evidences some of the difficulties inherent in the
endorsement test. As an initial matter, the identification of the reasonable observer is problematic,
particularly in the event the constitutional outcome varies from observer to observer. Assuming
that a hypothetical observer is familiar with the motivations of individual legislators is similarly
problematic because it renders the endorsement test virtually indistinguishable from the overbroad
legislative motivation standard. It is also difficult to assume that a reasonable student or citizen of
Dover would necessarily know and understand the intentionally obscure premise of Of Pandas
and People, particularly in light of the court's discovery that the book was not, at the time the
disclaimer was adopted, regularly available in the community. See id. at 756 (noting that the sixty
copies of the book for use in Dover High School that were funded by a church collection had to be
shipped to Dover). In short, the court's application of the endorsement test in Kitziniller required
a number of difficult determinations about the proper amount of information to attribute to two
different, reasonable observers of the Dover disclaimer, all of which were ostensibly instrumental
to its conclusion. Depending on the results of each of these individual decisions, the court's
analysis could easily be rendered over, or under, inclusive.
100. This discussion focuses on facially neutral disclaimers for two reasons. First, explicitly
religious disclaimers were effectively condemned by the court in Freiler, and are therefore likely
to be supplanted by facially neutral disclaimers as drafters continue to seek new formulations that
will survive constitutional scrutiny. See Freiler v. Tangipahoa Parish Bd. of Educ., 185 F.3d 337,
348 (5th Cir. 1999) (striking down disclaimer, at least in part, for its explicit reference to the
biblical version of creation); cf Selman, 390 F. Supp. 2d at 1302 (explaining that the absence of
explicitly religious language in a disclaimer "weighs heavily in favor of upholding the Sticker as
constitutional"). Second, in terms of their constitutionality under the Establishment Clause,
explicitly religious disclaimers are more straightforward than their neutral counterparts. In
general, the presence of sectarian language renders a disclaimer more likely to represent a
purposeful advancement of religion than the absence of such language. If the proposed standard is
indeed better suited to analyzing facially neutral disclaimers, it will therefore likewise be superior
in the context of explicitly religious disclaimers.
101. Stability and predictability are important, time-honored principles in our legal system.
See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 49 (James Madison) (discussing the "requisite stability" of "the
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IV.
The disparate-impact test used to evaluate facially neutral discrimi-
natory statutes under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments is a useful
model for this new standard. For starters, the discriminatory statutes
targeted by the disparate-impact doctrine are similar to evolution dis-
claimers. Much like statutes that discriminate based on race or gender
by singling out a particular group for unequal treatment, evolution dis-
claimers seek to demean evolution's credibility by distinguishing evolu-
tion from all other scientific theories.' °2 Moreover, like statutes that
have a discriminatory impact without specifically identifying the disad-
vantaged group, many evolution disclaimers, particularly since the
court's decision in Freiler, target evolution without including any
overtly religious references. Conversely, both categories of legislation
have the potential to be not only constitutional, but desirable, as in cases
where a statute's social benefits are significant and the negative impact
on evolution or a particular class of individuals is minimal.
The disparate-impact test consists of a two-part inquiry. It asks
first whether a provision causes a disparate impact, and, if so, whether
that impact is the product of a discriminatory legislative purpose. 0 3 The
doctrine is reserved for statutes that lead to unequal results for particular
wisest and freest governments"); see also BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL
PROCESS 149 (1921) (explaining that the judicial system could not function if a judge could not
"lay one's own course of bricks on the secure foundation of the courses laid by others who had
gone before him"); Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Stare Decisis and Judicial Restraint, 1991 J. SuP. CT.
HIST. 13, 16 (stating that the rule of law underlying our own Constitution requires continuity and a
respect for precedent).
102. Justice Scalia accused the majority of entertaining this point of view in his dissent in
Edwards. 482 U.S. 578, 630 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that the majority invalidated
the act because it demonstrated a "discriminatory preference for the teaching of creation science").
103. See Pers. Admin. of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 272 (1979); Arlington Heights v.
Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977). The doctrine is based on the general principle that
the Equal Protection Clause guarantees "equal laws, not equal results," Feeney, 442 U.S. at 273,
and that the social impact of a particular law is not itself a constitutional question, but one that
should be addressed by the legislature. See id. at 272 ("[T]he manner in which a particular law
reverberates in a society, is a legislative and not a judicial responsibility.").
Although the disparate impact test is not the only approach to evaluating the constitutionality
of facially neutral discriminatory statutes, it is the better one in this instance. The other standard
also involves a two-part test, the first prong of which asks whether a statute contains either an
"overt or covert" discriminatory classification. Id. at 273. If the answer is no, then the disparate
impact doctrine applies. See id. If the answer is yes, the statute's constitutionality is reviewed in
the same manner as a facially discriminatory statute. See id. By allowing for review of even a
"covert" classification, this standard could protect against legislative attempts to circumvent
constitutional protections through careful drafting. The remaining portion of this approach is less
helpful in the disclaimer context, however, as it provides for equal protection review of statutes
containing a discriminatory classification. For evolution disclaimers, this second phase would ask
whether a "discriminatory" disclaimer satisfies the low threshold of the rational basis test-i.e.,
whether the language of the disclaimer is rationally related to a legitimate government purpose.
See Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 230 (1981). Because this would be virtually
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individuals or groups when combined with independent social condi-
tions such as patterns of prejudice in "interrelated 'gateway' areas [such
as] housing, employment and education."' 0 4 These social conditions
represent an intervening cause that creates a degree of attenuation
between the provision under review and its unequal consequences. The
disparate-impact doctrine is best suited to deal with this attenuation
because it focuses courts not on the legislative question of how to cor-
rect social patterns of prejudice, but on the legal question of legislative
purpose.10 5 In this way, the doctrine restrains courts from overturning
every facially neutral statute with an undesirable or unequal effect, while
simultaneously ensuring that otherwise unconstitutional provisions do
not survive constitutional scrutiny merely through careful drafting. In
the context of facially neutral evolution disclaimers, social prejudice
against evolution may lead to the de facto promotion of religious expla-
nations of human origins in public schools, despite the fact that the dis-
claimers do not mention religion. In this situation, the "disparate-impact
model" first looks at whether a facially neutral disclaimer has the effect
of granting preferential treatment to a particular religion. If the answer
is yes, the question becomes whether that impact was the result of its
drafters' religious intent. This two-tiered approach permits courts to
review a neutral disclaimer without encountering the problems of over
and under-inclusiveness inherent in existing Establishment Clause
doctrine.
This doctrinal advantage is evident when we compare the disparate-
impact model to prior doctrinal approaches. Assuming, as we did above,
that the Establishment Clause prohibits the intentional advancement of
one religion or religious doctrine over another,10 6 the statutes at the
center of the Establishment Clause's prohibition are those that advance a
solely sectarian doctrine or belief for strictly religious purposes. The
first "ring" of provisions are those that are next most likely to be pre-
cluded by the Establishment Clause: legislation that has as its only con-
indistinguishable from Lemon's purpose prong, it is not an improvement over existing
Establishment Clause doctrine.
104. TRIBE, supra note 87, at 1511; accord Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004) (examining
the effect of a political redistricting statute as caused by racial prejudice); Hemandez v. New
York, 500 U.S. 352 (1991) (jury selection); Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457
(1982) (educational redistricting); City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980) (political
redistricting); Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449 (1979) (educational redistricting);
New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568 (1979) (prohibition on narcotics use); Vill.
of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977) (zoning); Washington v. Davis,
426 U.S. 229 (1976) (public hiring).
105. See TRIBE, supra note 87, at 1511 (discussing the role of "patterns of prejudice" in
disparate-impact cases).
106. See discussion supra notes 45-52 and accompanying text.
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sequence the advancement of religion, yet was enacted for secular as
well as religious reasons, or that was enacted only for religious reasons,
and, among other secular effects, promotes religion. This category is
unconstitutional because it is composed of legislation that not only suc-
cessfully and purposefully promotes religion, but does so with no more
than a limited secular influence. Moving further away from the doctri-
nal center, the next group of legislation is that which has secular pur-
poses and consequences, but is nonetheless likely to run afoul of the
Establishment Clause because it also successfully and purposefully
advances religion.
The third "ring" includes legislation that is strictly religiously moti-
vated but serves only a secular purpose, or, conversely, has as its pre-
dominant effect the advancement of religion, yet is the product of a
purely secular intent. Because each is so heavily imbued with either
religious sentiment or results, it may appear statutes in either category
should be invalidated. In reality, the opposite is true. As discussed
above, religiously motivated legislation without a religious impact
should not be struck down because legislative motivation alone is not
grounds to invalidate a statute. 10 7 Provisions with no religious purpose
but with an exclusively religious impact, however, may seem more prob-
lematic. Because they create a religious effect, these statutes are more
likely to appear to foster state promotion of religion. Practically speak-
ing, however, such enactments are extremely unlikely, as they would
constitute a complete failure by the legislature to obtain its secular
objectives. A statute with a purely secular purpose can only result in an
exclusively religious effect by mistake, and should therefore be repealed
on those grounds alone. Facially neutral statutes meeting this descrip-
tion are even less likely because their religious impact would not only
have to be independent of their purpose, but of their explicit language as
well.
The outer-most ring of legislation under the Establishment Clause
consists of statutes that have secular motivations and effects, but are also
the result of a religious legislative intent or have a religious impact.'
0 8
Neither of these categories, particularly in the context of facially neutral
provisions, are sufficiently narrow to be precluded by the Establishment
Clause.
Although somewhat abstract, the delineation of these various cate-
gories is helpful in demonstrating how the disparate-impact model
107. See discussion supra Part III B.
108. The truly final category, of course, consists of statutes with no religious purpose or effect.
They are not part of this analysis, however, because they are by definition outside of the
Establishment Clause's prohibition.
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avoids the pitfalls of existing Establishment Clause doctrine. For exam-
ple, the Lemon test, which prohibits statutes that have either a strictly
religious purpose or the primary effect of advancing religion, would
encompass provisions in the "core" as well as the first and third "rings"
described above. However, it would fail to identify statutes in the sec-
ond ring-those that successfully and intentionally promote religion
among other secular goals and outcomes-that likely violate the First
Amendment. By contrast, the legislative-motivation standard would
threaten legislation in all of the categories described above, regardless of
their constitutionality. The endorsement test embodies all of these
weaknesses. If the amount of information attributed to a reasonable,
objective observer is significant enough, the test will cover all of the
categories listed above, independent of merit. If a more limited amount
of information is assumed, then the endorsement test risks being as lim-
ited as Lemon's effects prong: it would invalidate only those statutes
with predominant, obvious religious results, and miss statutes that suc-
cessfully and intentionally promote religion without being exclusively
sectarian.
The disparate-impact model is more precise. By considering both
the religious impact and legislative intent of a statute, the disparate-
impact model is broad enough to implicate legislation in the core and
first two rings outlined above, but sufficiently limited to exclude the
remaining statutes that are purely secular in either motivation or impact.
This is particularly important in the context of facially neutral evolution
disclaimers, which are most likely to include statutes in the second
ring-those with a combination of religious and secular motivations and
consequences-that the other approaches either fail to consider, or only
include as part of an overly broad review.
For example, a scientific theory is defined as being subject to reex-
amination and, in the face of compelling evidence, amendment or even
retraction. 1°9 It would be entirely unobjectionable, constitutionally or
otherwise, to have schools "warn" science students of the dynamism of
the scientific method. It may also be unobjectionable (although not as
clearly so) to require educators to tell their students evolution is a theory
109. See, e.g., Kitzmiller v. Dover Area Sch. Dist., 400 F. Supp. 2d 707, 735 (M.D. Pa. 2005)
(citing expert testimony describing the scientific method as a "self-imposed convention of science,
which limits inquiry to testable, natural explanations about the natural world. .. [and] is a 'ground
rule' of science today which requires scientists to seek explanations in the world around us based
upon what we can observe, test, replicate, and verify"). Although there is a robust philosophical
debate regarding the definition of a scientific theory, the details of that debate are neither
necessary to, nor within the scope of, this analysis. See Jay D. Wexler, Note, Of Pandas, People,
and the First Amendment: The Constitutionality of Teaching Intelligent Design in the Public
Schools, 49 STAN. L. REv. 439, 466-68 (1997) (summarizing the debate).
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based on that method. The question could be complicated by naming
multiple scientific theories in this statement, including evolution. Fur-
ther down the constitutional slope would be a disclaimer informing stu-
dents that there are opponents to various scientific theories, perhaps
even identifying evolution as one such theory. If that same disclaimer
then pointed out that the existing objections to evolution did not them-
selves rise to the level of scientific theories, however, the constitutional-
ity of that statement may be more readily defensible.
The literal Lemon test likely would not identify any of these
facially neutral disclaimers as problematic because they are all relatively
easy to justify in secular terms. The legislative-motivation test, on the
other hand, could be used to invalidate any of these examples upon a
showing that a provision was adopted for a religious purpose. Similarly,
the endorsement test could be used to uphold or reject any of them,
depending on the depth of knowledge attributed to the "reasonable
observer." By contrast, the disparate-impact model is more discriminat-
ing. A court applying the disparate-impact test would likely uphold the
first statement on the grounds that defining a scientific theory does not
have any religious implications. The second statement raises the ques-
tion of whether naming evolution as a scientific theory subject to chal-
lenge (even when listed among other theories) results in a religious
effect. If the answer is yes, the disparate-impact model asks the addi-
tional question of whether the legislature adopted the disclaimer with the
intention of creating that religious impact. This is significant because it
protects a provision from being invalidated solely because it has some
religious implication. Whether the statement constitutes an unconstitu-
tional establishment of religion is better determined by also considering
the legislature's motivation in drafting it. A review of legislative pur-
pose holds legislatures accountable for facially neutral provisions while
avoiding unnecessarily chilling lawmakers by striking down a statute on
the basis of a single, unintended, and perhaps unforeseen, social conse-
quence. Similar circumstances apply to the analysis of the subsequent
statements listed above. Disclaimers drafted in such a way that they
implicate evolution without explicitly invoking religion complicate the
constitutional analysis such that a one-dimensional review of the provi-
sions' legislative motivation or religious impression is not sufficient to
answer the richer constitutional question of establishment of religion.
The disparate-impact model is also preferable because it is more
easily and consistently implemented. Unlike the legislative-motivation
and endorsement tests, the disparate-impact model does not run the risk
of being over-inclusive due to its requirement that a statute have some
religious impact. As a result, it can require a broader and more probing
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investigation into legislative intent than its less-constrained counterparts
without itself overreaching. In addition to official statements or posi-
tions regarding a disclaimer, evidence of legislators' individual beliefs
and those of their constituents can and should be considered in evaluat-
ing legislative intent. This will ensure that a disclaimer that has a relig-
ious impact and intent does not survive constitutional scrutiny simply
because the drafters were careful to keep the disclaimer and its legisla-
tive record facially neutral. This approach is not only clearer than the
endorsement test, which requires a case-by-case determination of what
evidence is available to the reasonable observer, but it also helps allevi-
ate the potential problem created by manipulation of the legislative
record.' Io
In short, the diverse and dynamic nature of facially neutral evolu-
tion disclaimers necessitates they be reviewed under a single, well-
defined standard. Through its two-part analysis and ability to probe
deeply into the question of legislative intent without being overbroad,
the disparate-impact model offers such a standard.
V.
The purpose of this analysis is a relatively modest one. It seeks to
evaluate current approaches to judging the constitutionality of facially
neutral evolution disclaimers and suggest a better alternative. Although
application of the proposed disparate-impact model may not have led to
different results in prior cases, it nevertheless serves an important doctri-
nal purpose. As an initial matter, it would help correct some of the
shortcomings of existing Establishment Clause doctrine as it applies to
evolution disclaimers. Perhaps more importantly, it provides a bench-
mark for future evolution-disclaimer cases-and, potentially, any other
challenges to facially neutral statutes under the Establishment Clause-
that will bring greater predictability to the doctrine. The disparate-
impact model meets this challenge by avoiding both the under and over-
inclusiveness of the Lemon test and its subsequent judicial interpreta-
tions. It also provides a vehicle for more focused and consistent judicial
inquiry, which is particularly important in the current political and legal
climate. The debate over evolution instruction has maintained a near
110. The personal and passionate nature of the evolution debate, particularly in public schools,
may render this concern over manipulation of the legislative record moot. All records to date
involving evolution disclaimers, even with respect to disclaimers that were facially neutral, have
been rife with statements of the religious significance of the disclaimer, despite the existence of
legal precedent counseling against such rhetoric. In fact, it may be that evolution disclaimers
cannot gain the necessary support without some official appeal to lawmakers' religious
sympathies. This does not mean, however, that manipulation of the legislative record should not
be considered in adopting a new test for evolution disclaimers.
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daily presence in the press, as evolution-disclaimer proposals have
become more common and popular. In the face of such a contentious
public debate, it is the role of the judiciary to protect individual citi-
zens-especially vulnerable and impressionable school children-from
State establishment of religion. This is best accomplished through the
development of a stable, reliable, and logically sound standard like the
disparate-impact model.
